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LAWRENCE C. BECKER 
AGAINST THE SUPPOSED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
HISTORICAL AND END-STATE THEORIES' 
(Received 1 February, 1981) 
Historical theories of distributive justice are supposed to stand in sharp 
contrast to end-state theories. I do not trunk they do. There is a limitation on 
the principles of rustorical theories which takes much of the interest out of 
them - at least insofar as that interest comes from their supposedly striking 
difference from end-state theories. 
I. THE GENERAL FORM OF HISTORICAL THEORIES 
The root idea of historical theories is simply that the history of a distribution, 
rather than its pattern of holdings, determines whether it is just. ] ust distribu-
tions come about necessarily, and only, from just original acquisitions plus 
just transfers (if any) of those holdings. 
The idea has considerable appeal - especially in Robert Nozick's elegant 
presentation of it. He puts the general form of historical theories as follows: 
Ir the world were wholly just, the following induct ive dcfinjtion would exhaustively cover 
the subject of justice in holdings. 
(1) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
(2) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding is entitled to the holding. 
(3) No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) application of 1 and 2'-
There are many possible principles of justice in acquisition (e.g., various 
forms of utilitarian and Lockean principles). And th.ere are many possible 
principles of justice in transfer. So the range of possible theories of this 
general form is quite large. (Nozick's argument for the general form, therefore, 
cannot be damaged merely by attacking rus own choices for those principles.) 
II. THE LIMIT A TION ON THE TRANSFER PRINCIPLE 
There is a stringent limitation on the general form of transfer principles, 
however. It is Utat transfers are bound by all but one of the general conditions 
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('provisos') attached to justice in original acquisition. (The one exception is 
non-ownership. Original acquisitions are by definition acquisitions of unowned 
things; transfers are not.) 
To see this, consider the controlling assumption of historical theories: They 
must all assume that just transfers are justice-preserving, somewhat (Natick 
says) as rules of inference are truth.preserving.' They must hold that if the 
transfer from A to B is just, and similarly for the transfer from B to C. C to D. 
and so on, then it follows that the overall shift in holdings from A to Z will 
be just. 3 If this proposition about the transitivity of justice is false, then the 
general form of historical theories is indefensible. 
It is not false. It is merely empty because of the limitation on transfers. 
Suppose the principle of acquisition is the Lockean one: I am entitled to 
whatever I can produce (from my own or unowned property) by means of 
my own labor. But there is the famous and necessary proviso: I am entitled 
to those things as long as I leave as much and as good for others.' Mill's more 
accurate formulation is: as long as my acquisition constitutes no 'loss' for 
others.' Now it might be thought that such a proviso operates only on the 
acquisitions, leaving us free to approve ,of any fully voluntary transfers of 
justly acquired holdings. (This is what gives historical theories a libertarian 
flavor.) But this isn't so. If the no-loss requirement restricts acquisitions, 
it must also restrict transfers . If my acquiSition of unowned things is only 
justifiable on the condition that it impose no loss on others, surely the 
justifiability of my acquisitions of owned things must be subject to the same 
condition. How could it not be? It is, after all, a condition on holding things 
as property, not simply on the act of acquiring them. 
Nozick is well aware of this point, though he discounts its importance. 
He writes: 
A theory which includes this [Lockean I proviso in its principle of justice in acquisition 
must also contain a more complex principle of justice in transfer. Some reOection of the 
proviso about appropriation constrains later actions .... Each owner's title ... includes 
... the Lockean priviso .... Thus a person may not appropriate [through Lockean original 
acquisition) the only waterhole in the desert and charge what he will. Nor may he 
charge what he will if he possesses one, and unfortunately it happens that all the water 
holes in the desert dry up, except for his. This unfortunate circumstance, admittedly no 
fault of his, brings into operation the Lockean proviso and limits his property rights. 6 
Nozick discounts the importance of this restriction because he takes a very 
narrow view of when an acquisition can be said to constitute a loss to others, 
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and because he believes that transfers in a truly free market will very rarely 
run afoul of this narrowly construed proviso.7 
There is good reason to reject a narrow construction of the no-loss require-
mentS But that is beside the point here. The point here is simply that each 
transfer must preserve the proviso on original acquisition. This imposes a 
perfectly general limitation on justice-preserving transfers. If they fail to meet 
it, they fail to preserve justice. 
The task of writing the proviso on the principles of acquisition and 
transfer is therefore an utterly central one for any historical theory. 
Ill. THE CONY ERGENCE OF HISTORICA L AND END -STATE THEORIES 
My contention is that the effort to write the proviso radically diminishes the 
distance between historical and end-state theories. This is best seen by exami-
ning two criticisms levelled at end-state theories on behalf of historical ones. 
First, end-state theories are criticized because they are predominantly sub-
stantive rather than procedural. It is thought to be much more difficult to 
establish the justice of a particular pattern of holdings than a particular 
procedure of acquisition and transfer. Second, end-state theories are criticized 
because they require constant tinkering - constant redistributions - to 
preserve the proper pattern of holdings. Such tinkering is said to be incompa-
tible with any reasonable amount of individual liberty. Nozick's Wilt 
Chamberlain example is designed to illustrate the point' So historical 
theories are touted as helpfully procedural and liberty-preserving. 
They are not. They are significantly substantive and liberty·limiting. They 
are substantive because the specification of the proviso (or absence of one) on 
the principle of acquisition is indistinguishable from the specification of a just 
pattern of distribution. They are liberty-limiting because the constant 
tinkering required to preserve the proviso in transfers (and holdings generally) 
is indistinguishable from the pattern-preserving activity objected to in end-
state theories. 
Take acquisitions first. Every principle of justice in acquisition either 
carries a proviso about the social context or it does not carry one. By a 
proviso about the social context I mean a specification of what background 
conditions - about the scarcity of available resources, the nature of the 
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people involved, and so on - make an acquisition unjustifiable. The no-loss 
requirement on Lockean acquisition is a social context proviso. So is the con-
cern for social welfare built into utilitarian acquisition. 
Suppose the principle of acquisition carries no proviso. Then its justifica-
tion must show how every possible pattern of distribution which might result 
from the application of the principle would necessarily be a just one - no 
matter what the social conditions. That task is equivalent to constructing an 
account of the correct pattem(s) of distribution, because all possible patterns 
must be surveyed and each must be judged justifiable. 
Now suppose there is a proviso on the principle of acquisition. Then its 
justification must show that all and only those patterns authorized by the 
proviso are justifiable. That task is also equivalent to constructing an account 
of the correct pattern(s) of distribution, because again all possible patterns 
must be surveyed and judged justifiable or unjustifiable. So either way, at 
the level of acquisitions, historical theories are no less substantive than end-
state theories. 
Now for transfers . They must preserve the social context proviso on acqui-
sition. If there is no social context proviso, then this requirement is empty, 
and historical theories, at the level of transfer, can be purely procedural. But 
every defensible principle of acquisition does carry a social context proviSO.1O 
Consequentialist principles do so by definition; labor principles are generally 
agreed to require some version of the no-loss requirement; and direct 
arguments from individual liberty carry the proviso that acquisitions not 
destroy others' liberty. So the requirement that transfers preserve the proviso 
on acquisitions is not empty - at least not for the range of plausible, as 
opposed to logically possible , historical theories. As a consequence, historical 
theories are as substantive at the level of tranfers as they are at the level of 
acquisitions. 
They are also every bit as liberty-limiting as end·state theories. Preserving 
the social conditions required by the proviso - through long chains of 
transfers, or just over time - is often impossible. Conditions (of scarcity, for 
example) are often outside the control of moral agents . When the conditions 
necessary for justice in holdings change in this way, justice can only be pre-
selVed by tinkering with titles. (The proviso comes into force to restrict the 
property rights of the owner of the waterhole.) One's title to a holding, then, 
will always be subject to redefinition as circumstances change, and restrictions 
on transfers will corne and go for similar reasons. Such tinkering with titles 
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is equivalent to the pattern-preserving activity objected to in end-state 
theories. The Wilt Chamberlain example applies to both. 
IV . A DISTINCTION W ITHO UT A DIFFERENCE 
So: both IUstorical and end state theories of justice are in part procedural. 
(End-state theories have to have principles of acquisition and transfer too.) 
And both types are substantive. Further, they each require the sort of 
tinkering with titles that limits individual liberty. What, then, is the difference 
between them? 
I submit that the truly interesting differences among theories of distributive 
justice concern the stringency of their provisos on acquisition and transfer. 1I 
And that difference concerns substance. It has notlUng to do with whether a 
theory is historical or end-state in form. 
Consider: Some end-state theories (e.g., those requiring strict equality in 
holdings) entail a great deal of pattern-preserving activity. They therefore 
seem preoccupied with the pattern. And some IUstorical theories (e.g., liber-
tarian ones) entail relatively little pattern-preserving activity and consequently 
seem predominantly procedura1. But it is the nature of the respective provisos 
on acquisitions and holdings wlUch is responsible for tlUs - not the theory-
form. After all, end-state theories can have very weak provisos and historical 
theories can have very strong ones. The end-state principle, 'Any pattern of 
holdings is just in which subsistence is possible for everyone', would presu-
mably reqUire very little tinkering with titles. The IUstorical principle, 'All 
and only those acquisitions (and tranfers) are just wlUch do not worsen others' 
socio-economic position relative to the acquirer', however, would require a 
great deal of tinkering_ 
So the real argument is about the strength of the proviso. The distinction 
between historical and end-state theories comes to very little. 
Hollins College 
NOTES 
• This paper started life as a set of comments on a paper by Bart Cruzalski, given, at 
the conference on rights, at Virginia Tech in May of 1980. I am indebted to Professor 
Gruzalski, to my colleague long Oh Ra, and to the members of the Faculty Writing 
Workshop at Hollins for help with revisions. 
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I Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York, 1974), p. 151. 
2 Ibid. The analogy is not exact. Nozick says "That a conclusion could h3ve been 
deduced by truth-preserving means from premisses that arc true suffices to show its 
truth. That from a just situation a situation could have arisen via justice-preserving means 
does not suffice to show its justice .... Justice in holdings is historical; it depends on what 
actually has happened." Ibid" pp. 151 - 152. 
] Transfer are supposed to preserve unjust distributions, too. That is why Nozick thinks 
he needs a principle of rectification: to correct the injustice preserved in steps wh ich 
begin with unjust acquisitions. There is, however, some reason to wonder about this. If 
I purchase a stolen car in good faith and the original owner, all her heirs, and the thief as 
weU are dead by the time the injustice is discovered, is any rectification needed? 
-4 John Locke, Second Treatise of Govemment, Book V, 27. 
5 John Stuart Mill, 'Principles of political economy', in: The Collected Works of John 
Stuart Mill (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1963), Book II, Ch. 11,6, p. 230. 
, Nozick, pp. 179- 180. 
1 Ibid., pp. 178 - 182. David Lyons critizes this aspect of Nozick's theory (by arguing 
that the proviso on transfers makes historical titles inherently unstable and subject to 
changes in circumstances) in his paper 'The new Indian claims and original rights to 
land', Social Theory and Practice 4 (1977), pp. 249- 272. 
, Lawrence C. Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, Boston and London 1977), pp. 42- 43. 
9 Nozick, pp. 160- 164. 
10 See the review in Becker, Chapters Three through Seven. 
II This is hyperbole, of course. There are interesting differences in the modes of acquisi-
tion and transfer, the content of the rectification principle, the compensation require-
ment, and so on. But none of these differences is related to the historical/end-state dis-
tinction either. 
